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The paper investigates the costs of waste disposal and recycling services by using a well-behaved Composite 
cost function model. Our estimates on a unique sample of more than 500 Italian municipalities highlight that 
the refuse collection technology exhibits constant returns to scale as well as scope economies between 
disposal and recycling. As far as the size of the municipality increases, scope economies rise up to 14%, but 
they are accompanied with overall diseconomies of scale. Our findings suggest that, on the one hand, joint 
management of disposal and recycling should be encouraged, and, on the other hand, that strategies aimed at 
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1. Introduction 
In local public services such as energy, water, public transport, the attention of policymakers 
has been devoted, on the one hand, on environmental regulation, and, on the other hand, on the 
promotion of competition and cost efficiency. As to the second issue, the policies that have been 
proposed are a mixture of mandatory divestitures, unbundling and competitive tendering, but 
ownership and corporate governance changes (ranging from privatization or the promotion of 
private public partnerships to forms of intermunicipal alliances) have been suggested as well.  
Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) services, similarly to other network industries, have 
undergone radical changes in both organizational and market structure. On the basis of EU 
directives 2006/12 and 2008/98, waste management legislation and policy should be inspired by a 
principle of hierarchy: prevention, preparing for reuse, recycling, recovery and disposal. This 
implies an increasing role of separated collection, with a target of 50% of MSW by 2020. In Italy, 
the legislation has foreseen even more ambitious targets (the share of waste sent for recycling was 
15% for 1999, 25% within 2001, and up to 60% in 2011). The reforms introduced by the Ronchi’s 
decree (law 22/1997) and by the Environmental Code (law 152/2006) aimed at favouring the 
integrated management of a too much fragmented production process, as well as at promoting 
competitive tendering procedures for the management of waste collection. Moreover, they 
introduced a new tariff system that, creating a direct connection between the solid waste generated 
by households and the amount to be paid for refuse collection, should induce citizens to adopt a 
more responsible environmental behaviour.  
As pointed out by Callan and Thomas (2001), the empirical literature has devoted much 
more attention to demand-side aspects (i.e., how to discourage land disposal, how to encourage 
recycling and recovery, how to design and implement an optimal pricing program, and so on)
2 than 
to supply-side issues such as the cost analysis of the MSW market. The evidence on the costs of 
waste collection and recycling is even more scant, as pointed out by Bohm et al. (2010):  
“The growth in curbside recycling has presumably evolved independently of costs and, 
perhaps for this reason, the economics literature is largely silent (with a few important exceptions) 
on understanding the costs of municipal waste and recycling services. Data limitations may have 
also hampered investigations into costs” (Bohm et al., 2010, p. 864). 
Since the collection of recycling waste has now reached a quite established share (though, at 
least for the case of Italy, not fully consistent across the whole national territory), and indeed is a 
                                                 
2 For example, see Kinnaman (2005 and 2006). In particular, Kinnaman (2005) tries to understand why municipalities 
are operating cost recycling programs designed to reduce the external costs of garbage disposal. The results pointed 
towards the presence of altruistic tastes for recycling on the part of households, so that policies aimed at setting specific 
recycling goals might be expensive but not effective at reaching the required target.    3
strongly encouraged practice in the planning of public services, an analysis of the costs of joint 
collection of disposal and recycling waste seems of great relevance. 
This paper aims to contribute to the above ongoing debate by analysing the cost structure of 
a sample of more than 500 Italian municipalities that provided waste collection and disposal 
services during years 2004-2006. From a methodological point of view, we will take into account, 
on the one hand, the multi-product nature of the MSW service by allowing for separate outputs for 
waste simply taken to disposal sites or incinerated and waste sent for recycling, and we will use, on 
the other hand, a flexible cost function model that is well equipped to measure scope and scale 
economies at different output levels. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section the relevant literature will be briefly reviewed. In section 3 we will present our empirical 
cost function model. In section 4 we will present our dataset an we will show some first descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 will show our main results, while section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Starting from the seminal works of Hirsch (1965) and Stevens (1978), scholars have 
analysed the costs of the refuse collection industry by investigating mainly issues such as the 
optimal scale of operation and the efficiency comparison between private and publicly owned 
operators.
3  
Overall, albeit there is some variance across studies, the results are pointing towards the 
existence of scale economies for relatively small communities that are exhausted when the 
population reaches a certain threshold (50,000 inhabitants according to Stevens, 1978). Another 
common results is that, rather than the type of ownership itself, the key factor which is more likely 
to bring cost savings in waste management activities is the organization of competitive tendering 
procedures.  
However, the bulk of the empirical papers have made use of rather ad hoc simple cost 
function models.
4 In a typical study, (average or total) costs are regressed on output (a measure of 
pick up points or of the quantity of waste collected in a year) and other explanatory variables 
without taking into consideration the role of input prices, and without respecting some common 
standard microeconomic theory assumptions (i.e. the so called regularity conditions, such as 
Shephard's lemma, linear homogeneity with respect to input prices, and so on).  
An under explored topic, despite its increasing relevance, is the multi-product nature of the 
refuse collection service. While in some instances the costs of recycling have been analysed by 
                                                 
3 See Bohm et al. (2010) for a comprehensive survey on the first issue and Bel et al. (2010) for updated references on 
the second issue. 
4 Antonioli and Filippini (2002) represents one of the few exceptions.   4
including the share of waste sent for recycling among the regressors, there are very few papers that 
jointly consider disposal and recycling.  
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature in both respects. From a 
methodological point of view, we will estimate a Composite cost function model, imposing 
restrictions in order to ensure that estimated costs are originating from a well-behaved cost function 
specification. In doing so, waste disposed and waste sent for recycling are considered as two 
separate but interacted outputs, so that it will be possible to infer whether economies of scope are 
characterising the provision of both services. 
 
2.1 Empirical studies of the costs of recycling 
Carroll (1995) focused on recycling costs only and found for a sample of 57 Wisconsin 
cities observed in 1992 that average recycling costs per household were negatively correlated to a 
measure of population density and to a variable accounting for in-house provision. Moreover, scale 
economies were found to be negligible. Most importantly, comparing his results with the ones 
stemming from the literature investigating garbage collection costs, the author found many 
similarities between the two technologies characterising waste disposal and waste sent for 
recycling.
5 
Bel and Fageda (2010) estimated a total cost function on a sample of 65 municipalities in 
metropolitan areas of the Spanish region of Galicia for year 2005, and included among the 
regressors a variable accounting for the percentage of the total waste volume that was designated 
for recycling. Since the coefficient was found to be not significantly different from zero, the authors 
concluded that: “the environmental advantages derived from promoting recycling activities do not 
seem to lead to an important increase in the cost of solid waste collection. Hence, the present 
results suggest that local government would do well to promote such recycling activities” (Bel and 
Fageda, 2010, p. 192). 
Bohm et al. (2010) analysed both solid waste disposal and recycling activities on a sample 
of 428 US communities for year 1996. Two quadratic cost functions (one for disposal, one for 
recycling) were simultaneously estimated using Zellner's SUR model.
6 While the average cost 
function for disposal was found to be everywhere decreasing, highlighting the presence of 
                                                 
5 For example, Hirsch (1965), working on a sample of 24 cities and municipalities in the St Louis area in 1960, 
suggested the presence of constant returns to scale. In a similar vein, Stevens (1978) estimated a Cobb Douglas cost 
function (including the price of labour among the regressors) on a sample of 340 US public and private firms, and found 
that, while private operators were better performers, economies of scale were exhausted at population sizes above 
50,000 inhabitants. 
6 The authors presented estimates where input prices were included among the regressors, too, but the usual 
microeconomic theory properties ensuring well-behaved cost functions (i.e. Shephard's lemma, homogeneity of degree 
one in input prices, concavity) where neither imposed on the estimation nor checked after having estimated the model.   5
increasing returns to scale, the one for recycling was exhibiting a U shape, suggesting that, after a 
certain threshold, the costs for recycling were increasing sharply. 
Callan and Thomas (2001) are, to the best of our knowledge, the only available study where 
disposal and recycling are jointly analysed in a context of a multi-product cost function framework. 
Using a sample of 110 municipalities in Massachusetts observed for years 1996-1997, they 
estimated two separate cost functions for the two services, each of which was including an 
interaction term between outputs. By doing so, they were able to measure, together with scale 
economies, scope effects too. The results suggested the presence of constant returns to scale for 
disposal and increasing returns to scale for recycling. Most importantly, the coefficients on the 
interaction terms were both found to be negative, and the computations referring to an hypothetical 
“average sample firm” revealed the presence of scope economies of the order of 5%.
7 
  
3. Model specification 
As already pointed out, to the best of our knowledge, only Antonioli and Filippini (2002) 
analysed the technology of the waste collection sector by estimating a well-behaved cost function 
which satisfies the regularity conditions. Using data on 30 Italian waste and disposal collection 
firms for years 1991-1995, they estimated a system of equations, including a Translog cost function 
and the associated cost-share equations, by applying the iterative Zellner’s (1962) seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) technique. The results suggest the presence of scale economies for small 
and medium-sized firms, while the largest firms in the sample were operating in an output region 
exhibiting diseconomies of scale.  
In a similar vein, our proposed research strategy will start with the estimation of a Translog 
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where C refers to the total cost of production, Yi refers to outputs (in our two-output case i, j = 
Disposal (D) and Recycling (R)), Pr indicates factor prices (in our three-input case r, l = Labor (L), 
Capital (K) and Energy (E)), and C is a random noise having appropriate distributional properties 
to reflect the stochastic structure of the cost model.  
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, the authors were not providing estimates of scale and scope economies for different output levels and 
for different combinations of outputs.   6
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where r is the error term relating to the cost-share r. 
However, due to its log-additive output structure, the Translog model suffers from the well-known 
inability to evaluate cost behavior when any output is zero. This has been proved to yield 
unreasonable and/or very unstable values of the estimates for scope economies. For such a reason, 
empirical studies based on the Translog specification often rely on measures of pairwise cost 
complementarities for analyzing cost synergies between outputs
9. 
To overcome the above problems, Pulley and Braunstein (1992) proposed as an alternative 
functional form for multi-product technologies the Composite Specification ( CS). The CS cost 
function originates from the combination of the log-quadratic input price structure of the TS 
specification with a quadratic structure for multiple outputs. This makes the model particularly 
suitable for empirical cost analysis. The quadratic output structure is appropriate to model cost 
behavior in the range of zero output levels and gives the CS specification a clear advantage over the 
TS form as far as the measurement of both economies of scope and product-specific economies of 
scale are concerned.
10 In addition, the log-quadratic input price structure can be easily constrained 
to be linearly homogeneous. 
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and the corresponding input cost-share equations are 
                                                 
8 Cost-shares are computed as Sr = (XrPr)/C. By Shephard’s Lemma Xr = C/Pr, where Xr is the input demand for the 
rth input, so that Sr =  lnC/  lnPr . 
9 For a twice continuously differentiable cost function, cost complementarities are present at Y' if 
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for all Y '  [0,Y]. Cost complementarities between two products imply that the marginal cost of producing one output 
decreases as the quantity of the other good is increased. Baumol et al. (1982) have shown that a multi-product cost 
function characterized by weak cost complementarities over the full set of outputs up to the observed level of output 
exhibits scope economies. 
10 See Piacenza and Vannoni (2004) and Piacenza et al. (2010), for more details on CS-type models and for some 
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Given the regularity conditions ensuring duality between the production function and the 
cost function, the CS specification does not impose a priori restrictions on the characteristics of the 
underlying technology. Thus, it is a flexible form in the sense of Diewert (1974). To be consistent 
with cost minimization, [1]-[2] and [3]-[4] must satisfy symmetry (ij = ji and rl = lr for all 
couples i, j and r, l ) as well as the following properties: a) non-negative fitted costs; b) non-
negative fitted marginal costs with respect to outputs; c) homogeneity of degree one of the cost 
function in input prices (rr = 1 and lrl = 0 for all r, and rir = 0 for all i); d) non-decreasing 
fitted costs in input prices; e) concavity of the cost function in input prices. Symmetry and linear 
homogeneity in input prices are imposed a priori during estimation, whilst the other regularity 
conditions are checked ex-post. 
  Therefore, as a second step of our analysis, we will estimate the Composite cost function 
system [3]-[4] and we will compare the results with the one stemming from the Translog system 
[1]-[2].   
 
4. Data Description 
Our dataset refers to a balanced panel of  529 Italian municipalities providing waste disposal 
and recycling services over the period 2004-2006, for a total of 1587 pooled observations.  
The sample composition by geographical area, ownership form and output mix is presented 
in Table 1. 39% of observations refer to municipalities localized in Northern and Southern Italy, 
respectively, while the remaining 22% are localized in the central regions of the country.  
As to the organizational form chosen to provide the service, in-house provision form 
accounts for 10% of the total sample, and is mostly concentrated in the South. A similar pattern can 
be observed for intermunicipal partnership, which accounts for only 8% of the municipalities (with 
a prevalence in the South). Finally, the limited responsibility company is by far the most popular 
juridical form chosen to organize the refuse collection service (82% of the entire sample and 94% of 
municipalities in the North).
11  
                                                 
11 Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us to disentangle corporations which are owned by private operators from 
limited companies whose shares are still in the hands of the local governments. Therefore, in the subsequent cost 
analysis we will not be able to separate the effects of corporatization (i.e. the transformation of the juridical form 
without implying a change in the ownership) from the ones stemming from privatization. See Cambini et al (2011) for 
an attempt to measure the impact of corporatization on the costs of a sample of Italian local public transport firms.    8
Turning now towards our main variable of interest, i.e. recycling activities, Table 1 shows 
that the share of the total waste volume designated for recycling is 20%. However, this average 
value is heavily dependent on the more virtuous Northern municipalities (where waste sent for 
recycling accounts for 37% of the total), while the shares of recyclable waste collected in Southern 
and Central regions of the country are rather limited (7% and 13%, respectively).  
On the whole, our sample can be considered as fairly representative of the entire population. 
In fact, official data (see Chiades and Torrini, 2008) show statistics which are very similar to the 
ones reported above.
12  
Data on costs and output quantities are obtained from annual MUDs (i.e. annual declarations 
concerning municipal solid waste collection) which have been provided by Ecocerved. Input prices 
have been computed by integrating the information available in the MUDs with additional 
information drawn from questionnaires sent to the firms (or organizational structures) managing the 
service in the municipalities. Total cost (C) is the sum of labor, capital, and energy costs of the 
municipalities.
13 The two output categories are tons of MSW disposed (YD) and tons of MSW 
recycled (YR). Productive factors are labor, capital and energy. The price of labor (PL) is given by 
the ratio of total salary expenses to the number of employees. Capital price (PK) is obtained by 
dividing depreciation costs by the capital stock.
14 Summary statistics on outputs, input prices and 
shares as well as other demographic and urban variables are provided in Table 2.  
 
5. Estimation and Results 
Both the TS and CS specifications of the multi-product cost function are estimated jointly 
with their associated input cost-share equations. In order to ensure that the cost functions are 
linearly homogeneous in input prices we normalize total cost and input prices by the price of 
energy. Because the three share equations sum to unity, to avoid singularity of the covariance 
matrix only the labor and capital equations (SL and SK, respectively) are included in the systems [1]-
[2] and [3]-[4]. Before the estimation, all the right-hand side variables were standardized on their 
respective sample average values. Parameter estimates were obtained via a non-linear GLS 
                                                 
12 For example, official data report that, in 2005, 11% of population (22% in the South) was receiving refusal collection 
services from municipalities by means of in-house arrangements. In the same year, the share of recycling over total 
refuse collection was 24% (38% in the North, 19% in the Central Regions and 9% in the South).  
13 Consistently with the large majority of empirical papers in this field, we rely on municipal data. It must be 
acknowledged that the reported cost data might in principle overstate the actual costs in the case in which the local 
public administrations are contracting with private firms for the provision of the service. Stevens (1978, p.441) tackles 
this issue and argues that the cost approach can be relied on. See also Carroll (1995, p.219) and Hirsch (1965, p. 91). 
This issue should however be mitigated by the completion of the reform geared to the exclusive assignment of the 
service through competitive tendering procedures. 
14 Following Antonioli and Filippini (2002), we assume that the price of fuel is the same for all municipalities in the 
sample.    9
estimation (NLSUR), which is the non-linear counterpart of the Zellner’s iterated seemingly 
unrelated regression technique. This procedure ensures estimated coefficients to be invariant with 
respect to the omitted share equation (Zellner, 1962).  
The summary results of the NLSUR estimations for the TS and CS models are presented in 
Table 3.
15 The first rows present the estimates of cost elasticities with respect to outputs and factor 
prices for the ‘average’ municipality.
16 The latter are very easy to recover from TS model, in that 
i CYi    , while Sr is simply the estimate of βr (see equations [1] and [2]). In the CS model the 
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By looking at the figures reported in Table 3, it appears that the two estimated cost function 
models are performing in a rather similar way: the estimates of labour (SL) and capital (SK) price 
elasticities are around 0.45 and 0.06 in both cases, and the same pattern applies to the estimates of 
the output elasticities: 
D CY  (
R CY  ) is 0.78 (0.23) for the TS model and 0.76 (0.25) for the CS model. 
The summary statistics are quite similar, too. The R
2 for the cost function is 0.93 in both cases, 
while the R
2 for the labor-share and capital share equations are higher for the CS specification.
17 
McElroy’s (1977) R
2 can be used as a measure of the goodness of fit for the NLSUR system. The 
results suggest that the fit is roughly the same for both specifications. More rigorously, the Vuong’s 
(1989) statistics for selection among non-nested models (VLR test), that consists in normalizing the 
standard LR test in order to account for the fact that the models to be compared are not nested, is 
significantly different from zero. We must therefore conclude that the CS model does a better job in 
describing observed data. Moreover, it enjoys a clear advantage over the TS model as far as the 
measurement of scope and scale economies is concerned, as it has been discussed in section 3. Scale 
economies (SE) can be measured by computing the inverse of the sum of output cost elasticities, 
                                                 
15 The Translog model is estimated with NLSUR so that it is straightforward to make comparisons with the Composite 
model. However, we estimated also the TS model using iterated GLS as well as maximum likelihood estimators. As 
expected, the results are virtually unchanged across the three different estimation procedures. 
16 The average municipality (the point of normalization) corresponds to an hypothetical council operating at an average 
level of production for each output and facing average values of the input price variables.  
17 A similar pattern can be observed by comparing the estimated sums of squared errors (SSE) of the cost and input-
share equations.    10
while scope economies (SCOPE) are computed by comparing the costs of specialized production 
with the costs of jointly providing YD and YR: 
 
SE = 1/(
D CY  +
R CY  )                                [7] 
SCOPE =  1
) Y   , C(Y




              [ 8 ]  
Table 3 highlights that the average municipality, which collects 17,122 tons of YD and 3,770 
tons of YR, and provides refuse collection services for a population of about 42,500 inhabitants,  
exhibits constant returns to scale and enjoys scope economies of the order of 2%. This means that, 
by doubling the amount of both disposal and recycling, costs will double as well. Moreover, 
consistently with the results found by Callan and Thomas (2001), there is an incentive to jointly 
provide both services.
18  
Fully exploiting the potential of our CS flexible cost function model, we can evaluate if and 
how scale and scope economies are changing if the size of the municipality and/or the output mix 
changes. Moving along row A of Table 4 it is possible to simulate how much waste disposal costs 
increase with size (assuming that recycling services are not provided). It appears that there are 
constant returns to scale up to  =1 (i.e. up to YD = 17,122 tons), and decreasing returns to scale in 
correspondence of larger output levels. Similarly, the figures reported in row B suggest that the 
same pattern applies to recycling activities.
19 However, diseconomies of scale are found to be larger 
for recycling than for disposal.
20 
  The costs of joint production C(YD, YR) – row C – are always lower than the sum of the costs 
of specialised production (C(YD, 0) + C(0, YR)). This is suggestive of the fact that the cost function 
exhibits scope economies at all simulated output levels, thus justifying the choice to assign the two 
services through a single tender. However, scope economies are rather limited (and not significantly 
different from zero) up to  =1, and become more important at higher output levels (7% for   = 4 
and 14% for  = 8).  
  The results for aggregate scale economies summarize the patterns reported above. The 
figures reported in the last row of Table 4 imply that, by doubling the amounts of refuse collection 
                                                 
18 The results of the Translog specification show the presence of cost complementarities, since the coefficient on the 
parameter αDR of equation [1] is negative (-0.12) and statistically significant.  
19 The presence of constant returns to scale for relatively small municipalities is consistent with Carroll (1995), who was 
using a sample of municipalities of an average population size of 26,284 inhabitants. In addition, the finding of scale 
diseconomies in correspondence with higher output levels is consistent with the analysis conducted by Antonioli and 
Filippini (2002), as far as disposal is concerned, and with the outcomes obtained by Bohm et al. (2010), as far as 
recycling is concerned. 
20 For example, moving from  =1 to  =8, costs increase by a factor of 9 for disposal and by a factor of 10.9 for 
recycling.   11
(both disposal and recycling), costs are doubling up to  =1. At municipality sizes above the sample 
mean, however, overall diseconomies of scale appear, but the presence of scope economies 
counterbalances the effect of decreasing returns to scale for both recycling and disposal activities. 
Therefore, the resulting estimates of aggregate scale diseconomies are found to be not very large.
21 
In spite of the fact that Table 4 shows estimates relative to six different hypothetical municipalities, 
the figures reported are quite plausible. For example, the 2004 Report on waste collection in the 
province of Milan indicated that the per capita average cost was increasing with the size of the 
towns, passing from 83.3 (110) euros for municipalities with less than 5,000 (more than 30,000) 
inhabitants up to 151 euros for the city of Milan. By dividing C(YD, YR) by the population size (first 
row), we obtain a very similar pattern, confirming that our model fits the data quite well. 
  Since our paper mostly focuses on recycling, we want now to investigate to what extent 
different shares of recyclable waste collection are affecting the level of costs. Figures 1a) and 1b) 
plot the behaviour of costs (on the vertical axis) for different percentage values of the ratio ShareR
 = 
YR/(YD+YR). Each curve corresponds to a specified level of the total quantity YD+YR
 . Similarly to 
what has been done in Table 4, the municipality size has been scaled up and down by multiplying 
and dividing the average sample quantities by the parameter . The shapes of the “isoquant” curves 
offer some very interesting insights. As expected, costs increase in correspondence with higher 
shares of recycling, but this happens especially at higher percentages and for municipalities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants.  
  The joint interplay of scope economies and decreasing returns to scale for the recycling 
technology implies that: 
a )  I t  i s  n o t  v e r y  c o s t l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p e rcentages of recycling up to 30%-35% at all 
municipalities’ sizes. For example, increasing recycling shares from 10% to 20% would imply that 
total costs increase by about 4% in correspondence of all estimated sizes (i.e. for   ranging from 
0.25 to 8). Moreover, for municipalities of a population size of about 300.000 inhabitants ( =8), 
the increase of ShareR from zero up to 10%-15% implies a slight reduction of total costs;
22 
b) It is not very costly to increase even further the percentages of recycling for relatively 
small municipalities; 
                                                 
21 The results of the Translog specification are remarkably similar also with respect to the estimates of scale economies 
for municipalities larger or smaller than the sample average.   
22 This is due to the fact that the effect of economies of scope is still dominating over the effect of decreasing returns to 
scale for recycling.    12
c) It is indeed very costly to increase the ratio ShareR beyond certain levels for large 
municipalities. For example, when  = 8, costs increase by 32.5% if ShareR increases from 20% to 
40%.
23 
The above results can be partially reconciled with some of the results summarized in section 
2.1. Bel and Fageda (2010) are working on a sample of a much smaller size as compared to our 
sample of Italian municipalities. Even if we are using a different methodology, results a) and b) are 
consistent with the absence of significant effects of recycling shares on total costs found for 
Galician municipalities. However, since our flexible functional form allows us to investigate the 
shape of the cost function at all output levels, we can better qualify their findings. Our estimates 
suggest that, for municipalities of a population size above 50,000 inhabitants, the impact of ShareR 
is not negligible anymore, and becomes very strong in correspondence with high values of .  
Bohm et al. (2010) report increasing returns to scale for municipalities that recycle up to 
13,200 tons and decreasing returns to scale for larger quantities. Our sample of Italian 
municipalities exhibits decreasing returns to scale, too, but they appear at lower output regions (at 
about 4,000 tons). 
We believe that our analysis can be useful for policymakers who are interested in pursuing 
strategies aimed at increasing the volume of recycling services. As already pointed out, recycling 
shares are still rather low in Italy, especially in the Southern regions. Our findings suggest that, 
keeping constant the total amount of waste collected, it is worth to expand recycling programs 
where the recycling shares are very low (irrespective of the size of the municipality), and, in the 
case of higher starting levels of ShareR, where the population size is below 150,000-200,000 
persons. Moreover, as argued by Bohm et al. (2010), the extra costs reported in Figures 1a) and 1b) 
are not taking into account possible revenues stemming from the sale of recyclable materials, as 
well as possible savings in the total waste collected due to a more responsible and environment 
friendly behaviour on the part of households.
24 Both arguments should have the effect of flattering 
the shape of the cost functions plotted in Figure 1, thereby reinforcing our arguments in favour of 




                                                 
23 Notice that for municipalites with population above 100,000 inhabitants, ShareR is on average 18% with a maximum 
value of 42%. Therefore, one should use particular caution when interpreting results for large councils (i.e. when  = 4 
and  = 8), because the curves in Figure 1b partially rely on out of the sample simulations. 
24 As stated by the authors: “Household source reduction efforts presumably complement recycling practices. 
Households that increase recycling may simultaneously seek ways to reduce the use of shopping bags and beverage 
containers” (Bohm et al., 2010, p.867).   13
5.1 Extended model 
As a first robustness check, we have split the sample and run separate regressions for small, 
medium size and large municipalities, as well as for the three different geographical areas. The 
results are very similar across sub-samples. However, our baseline model is, admittedly, very 
parsimonious, in that it only considers output quantities and input prices as right hand side 
variables. Therefore, we have enriched our specification by adding other explanatory variables that 
have been usually considered in the literature. Table 5 shows the results of the estimates of our 
extended TS model
25, where a time trend t, size dummies, geographical dummies, density, and 
organizational form dummies have been included among the regressors. In particular, small and 
medium are dummy variables  which identify municipalities where inhabitants are less than 20,000 
or included in the 20,000-50,000 range, respectively. Density is measured by the number of persons 
per square km.
26 In house and Intermun take the value of 1 in the cases in which waste is directly 
collected by the local authority or through cooperation between different municipalities. The 
remaining category, Corp, identifies the cases in which the service is provided by a company, which 
may be a private firm, a State-owned firm, or a private public partnership.
27    
The second column of Table 5 reports the estimates of the extended model. The coefficient 
of t is not statistically significant, so that, in the three year period under investigation, there has not 
been a significant technological progress. Small and medium sized cities appear to be characterized 
by lower collection costs as compared to municipalities that serve more than 50,000 citizens (the 
omitted category). Moreover, the costs are estimated to be lower in the Northern and Central 
regions of the country, confirming our a priori expectations.  
The results on ownership type and Density are intriguing and deserve more discussion.  
The negative and significant coefficient on In house suggests that, as compared to the 
omitted category (Corp), in house arrangements are characterized by lower costs. Albeit the results 
reached by the literature are rather mixed (Bel et al., 2010), our finding is somewhat contrary to 
expectations. We have two possible explanations for it. First, it is possible that for refusal collection 
services which are directly provided by the municipality, some costs categories (depreciation, 
interests on debts) are not fully reported, so that costs result to be underestimated. As a robustness 
check, we have run regressions (of both systems [1]-[2] and [3]-[4]) after having deleted the 159 
                                                 
25 The estimates of the CS model, which are available upon request, are very similar. We decided to present the results 
of the TS model for ease of exposition, since the estimated coefficients can be straightforwardly interpreted by the 
reader. 
26 We have used also the number of homes per square km, or the number of buildings per square km, as alternative 
measure, obtaining identical results. 
27 While data limitation prevent us to disentangle the three subcategories of Corp, official data report that in 2005 
11.1% of the Italian population was served by municipalities through in house arrangements, 58.5% by State owned 
firms, and only 30.4% by private operators. Therefore, a large part of municipalities classified as Corp (66%) organize 
garbage collection by relying on publicly owned firms.    14
observations where the dummy variable In house was equal to one. The results concerning scale 
economies and the impact on costs of the share of recycling are virtually unchanged. Secondly, by 
looking at the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1, it is easy to realize that 38 of the 53 
municipalities with in house arrangements are localized in the South, while in the other two regions 
such an ownership form is clearly marginal. Considering that, as reported by Chiades and Torrini 
(2008)
28, the share of in house arrangements in Italy has reduced from 34% in 1996 to 11% in 2005, 
it might be the case that municipalities that have decided to keep a direct management of the waste 
collection service are relatively more virtuous than the ones that have decided (or have been forced) 
to change their organizational form. Pursuing this line of investigation, we have run separate 
regressions for the three geographical areas. Quite interestingly, while the coefficient on In house 
remains significant and shows a larger effect (-0.12) for municipalities in the South (where the 
population served with in house arrangements has reduced from 11 million persons to 4 million 
persons from 1998 to 2007), it becomes positive and significant (0.17) for municipalities in the 
North. Finally, it must be considered that municipalities classified as In house are of a relatively 
smaller size. By running regression on the sub-sample of municipalities with less than 20,000 
inhabitants, we found that In house keeps its positive sign but loses significance. 
The coefficient of Intermun is positive but not significant. While Bel and Mur (2009) and 
Sorensen (2007) offer arguments and some empirical results in favor or against intermunicipal 
agreements as a way to reduce costs, our results, which show no significant effect, are inconclusive 
with respect to this important issue.
29 As a final remark, we must recall that our omitted category, 
Corp, is including mostly publicly owned firms (see footnotes 27 and 11), so that we are not able to 
examine the effect of full (or partial) privatization on costs. This must be considered if one wants to 
correctly interpret and appreciate our findings for the variables Intermun and In house. 
The coefficient on Density is found to be positive and significant. It is not rare in this field of 
studies to interpret the sign and magnitude of such a coefficient as evidence of the existence of 
economies\diseconomies of density.
30 However, we think that in the case of the refuse collection 
industry, given the high correlation existing between municipality size and degree of urbanization 
as proxied by a density measure, it is not appropriate to make such an inference. A positive 
                                                 
28 The authors found, for a sample of Italian municipalities, a negative impact of In house arrangements on costs, too. 
29 Bel and Fageda (2009), working on Spanish data, argue that intermunicipal agreements can be used as a way to reach 
scale economies for relatively small municipalities, while Sorensen (2007), working on Norwegian data, underlines the 
difficulties of managing the service when the ownership is very dispersed, as in the case of intermunicipal joint 
ventures. Consistently with Sorensen’s analysis, Garrone et al. (2010) found for a sample of Italian utilities operating in 
gas, water, electricity and refuse collection in the years 1997-2006, a positive and significant impact of a proxy of 
Intermun on total costs. 
30 Compare, for example, the comments offered by Bohm et al. (2010) and Carroll and Thomas (2001), who both found 
a positive coefficient on Density (measured as persons per square mile and number of homes per square mile, 
respectively).   15
coefficient could indicate, as suggested by Bohm et al. (2010), that high-density municipalities may 
incur high costs to transport waste due to the inability to operate vehicles in densely populated 
urban areas,
31 as well as to the need to drive towards remote landfills for disposal. In order to 
elaborate more on this, we have split Density into two variables, used as proxies for horizontal and 








  = UrbVER x UrbHOR      [9] 
The last column of Table 5 highlights that both coefficients are positive and significantly 
different from zero, but the impact of UrbHOR  is much higher. Therefore, the results are suggestive 
of the fact that congestion problems are more serious when the population is spread over several 
buildings with fewer floors than in the case with higher vertical development of buildings insisting 
on a given surface. 
The traditional approach to measure density economies in network industries (Caves et al., 
1985), requires to enrich the models [1]-[2] and [4]-[5] by including a proxy for the size of network 
(N) as an additional “output” (i, j) and to measure density economies as: 
 DE = 1/(
D CY  +
R CY  )              [ 1 0 ]  
and scale economies as: 
 SE=1/(
D CY  +
R CY  +
N CY  )           [ 1 1 ]          
The cost elasticity with respect to N (
N CY  ) measures how much costs increase when the 
network size becomes bigger, keeping constant the amount of waste (both disposal and recycling) 
collected. Accordingly, DE is a measure of how costs are rising when both outputs YD and YR 
increase, keeping constant the size of the network. When including N (measured by the number of 
homes) and the corresponding interactions with output and input prices in the system [1]-[2], we 
get, for the average sample firm, the following estimates:  
D CY  = 0.63 (standard error = 0.02), 
R CY  = 
0.19 (s.e. = 0.01) and
N CY  = 0.20 (s.e. = 0.03). Therefore, the refuse collection industry in Italy is 
characterized by the presence of density economies (DE = 1.22). This suggests that, in order to 
organize the service, franchised monopolies at the municipality level have to be preferred over side 
by side competition. In addition, the presence of scope economies points towards the organization 
of single tenders for both garbage and recycling activities. Finally, overall scale economies are 
                                                 
31 For instance, the presence of narrow streets may reduce the ability to use large, specialized equipment. In addition, 
the extent of on-street parking may involve difficulties in using some automated machinery, with the consequence that  
operators are forced to use more manual labor.   16
found to be constant (SE = 0.99), confirming our previous results for the baseline model.
32 
Therefore, our results suggest that aggregating nearby councils (which implies to increase 
simultaneously both waste collection and N) could not bring savings in total costs. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Despite the importance of the refuse collection service and the rising worries about the 
impact of waste disposal activities on the environment, the empirical literature on the costs of 
garbage collection and disposal is rather limited. The available empirical works mostly concentrate 
on the US, and, most importantly, recycling activities are rarely included into the analysis.  
Our paper provides fresh evidence on the above issues by analysing a sample of Italian 
municipalities which are observed in the years 2004-2006. From a methodological point of view, 
we jointly consider waste taken to disposal sites or incinerated and waste sent for recycling in a 
multi-product framework. Moreover, we will estimate cost function models which are consistent 
with the duality assumptions of microeconomic theory.   
Our results suggest that, for a municipality of a size of about 42,500 inhabitants, the refuse 
collection industry exhibits aggregate constant returns to scale, while moderate economies of scope 
can be enjoyed by simultaneously providing disposal and recycling services. While scope 
economies are increasing with the size of the council (up to 14% when inhabitants are about 
300,000), decreasing returns in the collection of both garbage and waste sent for recycling are such 
that moderate overall diseconomies of scale appear for large municipalities. 
Our simulations suggest that it is worth to devote efforts to increase the share of recycling 
activities up to 30%-35%, since the total costs of refuse collection would not increase too much, and 
this is especially true for relatively small municipalities. 
The estimates of the extended model add new important insights. First, refuse collection 
costs are found to be lower in the Northern regions of the country and for municipalities with a 
population below 20,000 inhabitants. Second, while urban areas face higher congestion costs, 
especially due to horizontal urbanization effects, there is clear evidence of the existence of density 
economies. Finally, councils that are relying on intermunicipal joint-ventures as organization forms 
to provide the service are not exhibiting lower costs. 
                                                 
32 Notice than in the last two columns of Table 5 the coefficient on YD is lower than the estimates reported for the 
baseline model (incidentally, when adding a proxy for density among the regressors, Bohm et al. (2010) experience a 
similar contraction, too). Coupling our discussion about the role of the variable Density with our results for density 
economies (DE), we do not think that the estimates of the extended models should be considered as supportive of the 
presence of increasing aggregate returns to scale for the average firm. Our interpretation is that the variable Density is 
capturing part of the magnitude of the output elasticity 
D CY  .   17
From a policy point of view, we think that the above set of results provide some useful 
insights. Our computations suggest that recycling programs should be strongly encouraged, since 
total costs are not likely to increase sharply. This is particularly important in a country like Italy 
where, as reported in our descriptive statistics, the share of recycling activities is somewhat limited, 
especially in the South. The presence of density economies suggests that franchised monopolies 
could be the better form to provide the service, while the existence of scope economies suggests 
that tender procedures should be organized so as to consider disposal and recycling activities as a 
single bundle. However, since we found constant returns to scale up to 21,000 tons of waste 
collection (i.e. up to a service area of about 45,000 inhabitants), we cannot provide support for the 
arguments in favour of the consolidation of the service for small municipalities.  
Finally, our results provide useful insights for managers in charge of the planning and 
management of the refuse collection services. In fact, managers must have a precise idea of the 
costs of garbage collection and on the impact of recycling activities on total costs when they must 
decide whether and to what extent participating to tendering procedures or simply when they are 
required to compute the budget plans for the waste management activity.   18
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Table 1. Sample breakdown by geographical area  
 North  Centre  South  Total 
Number  of municipalities  204 118  207  529 
- In house   2%  9%  18%  10% 
- Intermunicipal partnership  4%  4%  15%  8% 
- Corporation  94%  87%  67%  82% 
Share of Recycling  37% 13%  7%  20% 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
  Mean Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Total Cost (10
3 euro)  5,436 23,965 46 48,065 
Output   
Waste Disposed (tons)  17,122 71,196 118.44 1,462,128 
Waste Recycled (tons)  3,770 13,044 8.86 210,211 
Input prices   
Price of capital   0.102 0.021 0.040 0.160 
Price of labor (euro)  36,607 5,735 22,663 62,613 
Cost shares   
Capital share (%)  5.71 3.90 1.00 17.90 
Labor share (%)  44.90 12.01 18.91 73.02 
Other variables   
Density   902.8 1,242 21.83 9,441 
Population   41,058 142,272 993 2,711,491 
Number of homes   19,336 67,165 430 1,150,547 
Number of buildings  4,960 7,309 353 127,713 
  Share of recycling (%)  19.8 17.7 0.1 76.5 
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Table 3. NLSUR estimation: Translog (TS) and Composite (CS) cost function models 
a  
  TS  MODEL CS    MODEL 
Output and factor price elasticities
 b    
D CY          0.7812*** 
(0.0120) 
     0.7601*** 
(0.0082) 
R CY         0.2305*** 
(0.0112) 
     0.2466*** 
(0.0099) 
SL       0.4480*** 
(0.0030) 
     0.4487*** 
(0.0028) 
SK       0.0604*** 
(0.0019) 
     0.0546*** 
(0.0257) 
Scale and Scope Economies





SCOPE  -      0.0209** 
(0.0089) 
Cost complementarities CC       -0.1196*** 
 (0.0070) 
- 
Cost function    
R 
2 0.9308  0.9298 
SSE 
c  133.48 135.34 
Labor share equation     
R 
2 0.1261  0.2342 
SSE 20.01  17.53 
Capital share equation     
R 
2 0.1784  0.2060 
SSE 1.99  1.93 
System log-likelihood  4083.09  4175.86 
    
Goodness of fit 
d 0.8237  0.8262 
    
VLR test statistic 
e  CS vs. TS: VLR = 8.03*** 
a Estimated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
b The values are computed at average values of output and input price variables. The coefficient subscripts are  
D = disposal, R = recycling, K = capital, L = labor. 
c Sum of squared errors. 
d The goodness-of-fit measure for the NLSUR systems is McElroy’s (1977) R
   2. 
e See Vuong (1989).  The VLR statistic is distributed as a N (0,1). 
*** Significant at 1 percent level in a two-tailed test. ** Significant at 5 percent level. For the SE index the null hypothesis is that it 
is not significantly different from one.  22
Table 4. Estimated costs (CS model) for disposal and recycling at different output levels  
 
 Scaled  outputs 
a 
   = 0.25 
YD=4,281
YR =943 
 = 0.5 
YD=8,561 
YR =1,865 
 = 1 
YD=17,122 
YR =3,770 
 = 2 
YD=34,244 
YR =7,540 
 = 4 
YD=68,488 
YR =15,080
 = 8 
YD=136,976
YR =30,160
         
Population Size  13,500  25,000  42,500  92,000  163,000  290,000 
             
Product-specific estimated costs:         
A)       C(YD, 0)  892  1,784  3,592  7,308  15,136  32,382 
B)       C(0, YR) 292  583  1,190  2,497  5,491  12,994 
Total (A+B)  1,184  2,367  4,782  9,805  20,627  45,376 
         
Multi-product estimated costs         
C)      C(YD, YR)  1,170 2,336  4,684  9,439 19,189 39,649 








   0.02** 
(0.01) 
  0.04** 
(0.02) 
    0.07***
(0.03) 
    0.14***
(0.05) 
Overall Scale Economies (SE) 












a  =1 indicates a municipality that collects average quantities of YD and YR. The parameter  is used to scale up and 
down the outputs of the “average municipality”. Costs are measured in thousands of euros. 
b Standard errors in parenthesis.*** Significant at 1 percent level in a two-tailed test. ** Significant at 5 percent level  





Figure 1. Costs and Recycling Shares 
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Table 5. Translog estimates of the baseline and extended cost function models [1]-[2] 
    BASELINE  
       MODEL 
EXTENDED MODEL I  EXTENDED MODEL II 
REGRESSORS 
a 
Estimates s.e.  Estimates  s.e. Estimates s.e. 
Constant  15.402*** (0.012)  15.576***  (0.035)  15.154*** (0.057) 
lnYD           0.781***  (0.012)   0.712***  (0.018)   0.707***  (0.018) 
lnYR    0.231***  (0.011)   0.230***  (0.016)   0.229***  (0.016) 
lnYD 
2 
 0.367***  (0.027)   0.299***  (0.028)   0.301***  (0.027) 
lnYR  
2          0.178***  (0.012)   0.156***  (0.014)   0.161***  (0.014) 
lnYD ln YR  -0.120*** (0.007)  -0.099***  (0.007)  -0.101*** (0.007) 
lnPL   0.448***  (0.003)   0.448***  (0.003)   0.448***  (0.003) 
lnPK   0.060***  (0.002)   0.060***  (0.002)   0.060***  (0.002) 
lnPL
 
2   -0.254*** (0.018)  -0.255***  (0.018)  -0.254*** (0.018) 
lnPK
 
2   0.034***  (0.006)   0.040***  (0.006)   0.040***  (0.006) 
lnPL lnPK   0.056***  (0.009)   0.060***  (0.009)   0.060***  (0.009) 
lnYD lnPL   0.005***  (0.001)   0.005***  (0.001)   0.005***  (0.001) 
lnYR lnPL   -0.002** (0.001)  -0.002**  (0.001)  -0.002** (0.001) 
lnYD lnPK   0.148***  (0.041)   0.123***  (0.042)   0.133***  (0.041) 
lnYR lnPK  -0.013 (0.029)  -0.012  (0.030)  -0.013 (0.030) 
t  - -  0.001  (0.008)  0.002  (0.008) 
ln Density  -  -     0.060***  (0.007)  -  - 
ln UrbHOR   -  -  -  -     0.118***  (0.013) 
ln UrbVER  -  -  -  -     0.037***  (0.008) 
North  -  -  - 0.129***  (0.027)  - 0.151***  (0.027) 
Center  -  -   -0.101***  (0.022)   -0.121***  (0.022) 
Medium  -  -   -0.099***  (0.034)   -0.084**  (0.034) 
Small  - -   -0.166***  (0.040)   -0.150***  (0.040) 
In house  - -   -0.063***  (0.024)   -0.062***  (0.023) 











a Estimated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
b The goodness-of-fit measure systems is McElroy’s (1977) R
2.
 
The coefficient subscripts are D = disposal, R = recycling, K = capital, L = labor. *** Significant at 1 percent level in a 
two-tailed test. ** Significant at 5 percent level in a two-tailed test. All regressors, except from dummies and t, have been 
normalized on their respective sample mean values. 